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INTRODUCTION
When is a person’s expectation of privacy “reasonable?” In 1967,
the Supreme Court held that an electronic listening recording device
atop a public telephone booth was an unreasonable invasion of
privacy.1 Conversely, in 1979, the Court deemed a pen register (an
electronic device that records dialed phone numbers from a particular
line) on phone company property reasonable. 2 In 2001 and 2012,
respectively, the Court reasoned that the use of an Agema
Thermovision 210 thermal imaging device to detect rudimentary heat
registers of a home was unreasonable, 3 as was the use of a globalpositioning-system (GPS) tracking device to chart an individual’s
* J.D. candidate, May 2019, Chicago-Kent of Law College, Illinois Institute of
Technology. Executive Articles Editor, Chicago-Kent Law Review. Thank you to
Lawrence Surinak for his constant support, legal insight, and willingness to discuss
the Fourth Amendment after work hours. A special thanks to Stacey Surinak as well,
my Naperville-based field researcher who spoke to any utility providers she caught
at the source.
1 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
2 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
3 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
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movements for twenty-eight days.4 And in 2018, the Supreme Court
found that 127 days of cell-site location data (CSLI), obtained without
a warrant, was unreasonable, too. 5
Determining reasonability is at the heart of Fourth Amendment
analysis. Specifically, courts must ask: (1) whether an individual has
exhibited an actual, subjective expectation of privacy; and (2) whether
this expectation is one that society would recognize as being
“reasonable.”6 Courts reject mechanical Fourth Amendment
interpretations in favor of an approach that lends generous support to
citizen privacy. 7 Doing so ensures that no individual is “at the mercy
of advancing technology.”8 Indeed, courts are bound to “take account
of more sophisticated systems that are already in use or in
development.”9
Undoubtedly, the most pressing Fourth Amendment issue to arise
in the advent of new technology is how information is obtained. This
issue touches on the second part of the Fourth Amendment analysis:
reasonability. Information is typically obtained by one of two means: a
(1) court order; or (2) warrant. The most marked difference between
the two is the standard that must be met. For example, a court order
granted pursuant to the Stored Communications Act requires a
showing of “reasonable grounds” for believing that records were
“relevant and material to an ongoing investigation.” 10 In contrast, a
warrant requires probable cause, which is a significantly heightened
standard from “reasonable grounds.” 11 Courts have historically held
that official intrusion into the private sphere, in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, generally requires a warrant supported by probable

4

United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
6 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
7 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 36.
10 Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012).
11 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2221.
5
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cause.12 In the Fourth Amendment context, this difference is marked,
though in other areas of law the terms are used almost
synonymously.13
In Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. City of Naperville, the
Seventh Circuit held that, although the City of Naperville conducted a
Fourth Amendment search when it replaced analog energy meters with
digital “smart meters,” Naperville residents did not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the data the meters produced.14 Thus, the
City of Naperville can now compile the smart meter data – every
fifteen minutes – without a warrant and store it for up to three years. 15
The Seventh Circuit set forth a cautionary posture, clarifying that
decisions such as this are case-dependent and may vary due to factors
such as the interval of data collection or accessibility of data to law
enforcement.16 Yet, because smart meters allow for more efficient
power restoration, reduce strain on the power grid, and lessen labor
costs, the court found that the fifteen-minute data collection intervals
were reasonable.17
This comment will argue that the Seventh Circuit erred in
rejecting the plaintiff’s request to file a third amended complaint and
that any “balancing test” to determine the “reasonable” component of
a Fourth Amendment inquiry is untenable and unconstitutional under
strict scrutiny analysis. These issues are particularly pressing in
consideration of technological advancement’s rapid pace. While
reasonability may be context-specific, the precedent the Seventh
Circuit established here is dangerous because it was made without
considering the ramifications of massive data collection, regardless of
the context of that collection. This comment will also argue that
12

Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979).
See, e.g., 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-118.1(b)(2) (West, Westlaw
through P.A. 110-1114); People v. Fortney, 297 Ill. App. 3d 79, 87 (2d Dist. 1998)
(citing People v. Brodeur, 189 Ill. App. 3d 936, 940 (2d Dist. 1989)).
14 Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. City of Naperville, 900 F.3d 521, 524
(7th Cir. 2018).
15 Id. at 524.
16 Id. at 529.
17 Id.
13
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defining distinct categories as to what is reasonable or unreasonable is
an equally poor solution, as has been noted by other courts considering
the matter.18
The Supreme Court, in accordance with Smith v. Maryland and
United States v. Miller,19 generally employs a quasi-balancing test to
weigh each party’s respective interests in various types of information.
This method forces courts to give credence to the “quality or quantity
of information obtained” in a search, which has never been tied to the
Fourth Amendment’s protections, whether in the home or elsewhere. 20
By making determinations as to what is protected in the home,
including the nature of what is protected in the home based upon the
intervals at which the data is collected, the Seventh Circuit
compromised the Fourth Amendment protections the framers
intended.21 The third-party doctrine is inapplicable where the City of
Naperville required the installation of digital smart meters to replace
the analog meters because the City is the only electric provider, further
heightening the risk of private information disclosure. 22 Plainly put,
residents were given no choice in this matter, and the repercussions of
the Seventh Circuit’s ruling, against the will of the City of
Naperville’s citizens, should not be taken lightly.
Section I of this comment will discuss the historical
underpinnings of the Fourth Amendment, along with its protections as
technology has continued to advance. Section II will discuss the
background of Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. City of
Naperville, and how the Seventh Circuit reached its decision to deny
the plaintiff’s request to file a third amended complaint. Section III
18

Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 41-51 (2001). (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(positing that the balancing test is a misinterpretation of Smith v. Maryland and
United States v. Miller, as are suggestions to establish distinct categories of
information that require a warrant and those that do not).
19 See generally Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); United States v.
Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
20 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 27.
21 See infra notes 28–41.
22 Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. City of Naperville, 900 F.3d 521,
526–27 (7th Cir. 2018).
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will discuss why the Seventh Circuit erred by reviewing precedent and
policy considerations. Section III will also reveal why all courts, the
Seventh Circuit included, should proceed with Fourth Amendment
analysis on a case-by-case basis to safeguard constitutional privacy
guarantees pursuant to strict scrutiny analysis.
I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The Fourth Amendment guarantees “The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures.”23 This right “shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”24 But, when is
a search a “search?” And when is a search “unreasonable?”
Technological advancements have inarguably changed the
purview of the Fourth Amendment’s reach, and in a confusing way.
But, how did the courts arrive at this juncture? Traditionally, the
Fourth Amendment applied to property interests by protecting against
trespass.25 However, courts expanded this application to hold that the
“principal” object of the Fourth Amendment is not the protection of
property, but of privacy. 26 This shift came about from judicial
recognition that privacy should be protected from unreasonable
invasions.27 Today, courts agree about the general test to apply to
Fourth Amendment questions, 28 but there is no obvious answer to
when something is “reasonable.” This is especially true as technology
continues to evolve, and at ever-increasing speeds.
23

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Id.
25 Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 64 (1992).
26 Id. (citing Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); Jones
v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505
(1961)).
27 Warden, 387 U.S. at 305.
28 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
24
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A. History, Interpretations, and Technological Challenges
The fundamental purpose of the Fourth Amendment “is to
safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary
invasions by government officials. 29 When it was enacted, the Fourth
Amendment was in “response to the reviled ‘general warrants’ and
‘writs of assistance’ of the colonial era, which allowed British officers
to rummage through homes in an unrestrained search for evidence of
criminal activity.”30 As technology advanced and the government
gained access to areas traditionally concealed, particularly within the
home, courts struggled to consistently and predictably “assure[]
preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed
when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.” 31 However, despite this
ongoing struggle for uniform applicability, the Fourth Amendment
unequivocally preserves privacy against the “uninvited ear” of
governmental intrusion.32
It is critical to understand the meaning of the term “search” for
Fourth Amendment interpretation. While the Supreme Court has never
adopted an official definition of the term, a search is generally
understood as “some exploratory investigation, or an invasion and
quest, a looking for or seeking out.” 33 “A search implies a prying into
hidden places for that which is concealed and that the object searched
for has been hidden or intentionally put out of the way.” 34 Generally
speaking, looking at an area open to the public is not a “search.” 35 A
29

Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494 (2014).
31 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
32 People v. Richardson, 60 Ill. 2d 189 (1975); People v. Loveless, 80 Ill. App.
3d 1052 (3d Dist. 1980).
33 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 2.1(a) (5th ed. 2018); FRANCIS C. AMENDOLA ET AL.,
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AS TO SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, 79 C.J.S. SEARCHES
§ 1 (2018).
34 LAFAVE, supra note 33.
35 Id.
30
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person only has a justified expectation of privacy with respect to the
interior of his personal residence. 36 However, what constitutes a
“search” is fact-dependent in each case.
There are two approaches to Fourth Amendment protections: (1) a
property-based approach; and (2) a privacy-based approach.37 The
property-based approach is the traditional approach premised on
trespass, which recognizes a privacy interest when the government
physically intrudes on a person’s house, papers, or effects. 38 In
contrast, the privacy-based approach is the more modern trend where
courts recognize that the Fourth Amendment extends beyond property
rights and into other areas in which an individual has a reasonable
expectation of privacy.39 In the modern approach, courts must ask
“whether the complaining person had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the area invaded.”40 The privacy-based approach does not
detract from the property-based approach;41 rather, it provides
additional protections.42
The most immediate issue facing courts today in the Fourth
Amendment context is technology. After all, the Supreme Court has
noted that one cannot mechanically interpret the Fourth Amendment
because doing so would “leave the homeowner at the mercy of
advancing technology.”43 Courts note that while some systems might
be crude, the rule the Court adopts has to take account of sophisticated
systems already in use or development. 44 For example, in Kyllo v.
United States, the Court found that the thermal imager used to scan a
36

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
People v. Bonilla, 2017 IL App (3d) 160457, ¶ 12.
38 Id. (citing Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 5 (2013)).
39 Bonilla, 2017 IL App (3d) 160457, ¶ 13 (citing Jardines, 569 U.S. at 5–6).
40 Bonilla, 2017 IL App (3d) 160457, ¶ 13 (citing Jardines, 569 U.S. at 10–11;
People v. Burns, 2016 IL 118973, ¶¶ 27, 45).
41 Bonilla, 2017 IL App (3d) 160457, ¶ 13 (citing United States v. Jones, 565
U.S. 400, 414 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); Burns, 2016 IL 118973, ¶ 27).
42 Bonilla, 2017 IL App (3d) 160457, ¶ 13.
43 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001).
44 Id. at 38.
37
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triplex, which displayed heat signatures in black (cool), white (hot),
and shades of gray for everything in-between, may have been
rudimentary, but was technology that nevertheless demanded Fourth
Amendment protections.45 Use of even a rudimentary thermal imager
still constituted a “search” in need of protection.46 The Court reiterated
this concept – that even rudimentary technology is technology that
demands constitutional protection – on numerous occasions. Indeed, as
Justice Brandeis noted in his dissent in Olmstead v. United States, this
Court is obligated as “[subtler] and more far-reaching means of
invading privacy have become available to the Government,” to ensure
that no scientific progress erodes Fourth Amendment protections.47
B. Supreme Court Precedent
In 1967, the Supreme Court decided Katz v. United States.48 The
Katz Court held that Katz had a reasonable expectation of privacy in
his communications in a phone booth and that the government, in
electronically listening to and recording the conversation, made a
“search and seizure” pursuant to the Fourth Amendment. 49 In Katz, the
Federal Bureau of Investigations (“FBI”) attached an electronic
listening and recording device atop a public telephone booth where
Katz placed calls. 50 While the government argued that a public
telephone booth is not a constitutionally protected area, the Court,
setting forth that the Fourth Amendment protects people, and not
places, determined that the location of the calls was immaterial. 51
Pursuant to the plain language of the Fourth Amendment, location is
irrelevant to the protections granted with the exception that people are
45

Id. at 29–30.
See infra notes 66–73.
47 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018) (quoting Olmstead
v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 473–74 (1928)).
48 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
49 Id.
50 Id. at 348.
51 Id. at 351.
46
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always to be secure in their houses.52 Moreover, due to the privacybased shift in Fourth Amendment interpretation, it extended to “the
recording of oral statements overheard without any ‘technical trespass
under . . . local property law.’”53 Whether a trespass occurred was
irrelevant, and the Court found that there was an intrusion into a
“constitutionally protected area.”54
Almost a decade later, the Court decided United States v. Miller.55
Miller charged the Court with determining whether a bank depositor
had a protectable Fourth Amendment interest in his bank records. 56
The Court found that the bank depositor did not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in bank records, here consisting of microfilms,
checks, and deposit slips, because they were not “private papers.”57
Instead, they were business records.58 This case addressed third-party
doctrine as well, finding that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit
obtaining information that has been revealed to a third party. 59 Here,
the depositor assumed the risk that the information would be conveyed
to the Government by revealing that information to another entity.60
Any subpoenas issued to the bank to obtain the depositor’s records,
therefore, posed no threat to the depositor’s Fourth Amendment
rights.61
Later, in Smith v. Maryland, the Court determined whether
installation and use of a pen register at the phone company’s central
office to record numbers dialed from the petitioner’s home phone
52

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
389 U.S. at 352–53 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505,
511 (1961)).
54 Silverman, 365 U.S. at 511–12.
55 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 443 (citing United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751–52 (1971);
Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427
(1963)).
60 Miller, 425 U.S. at 443 (citing White, 401 U.S. at 751–52).
61 Miller, 425 U.S. at 444.
53Katz,
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constituted a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 62
The Court reasoned that not only is it doubtful that phone users have
an expectation of privacy in numbers dialed, 63 but that because the pen
register was installed on phone company property, the plaintiff could
not claim that any of his property was invaded or that there was an
intrusion into a “constitutionally protected area.” 64 The Court reasoned
that individuals know that phone companies generally keep records of
numbers dialed, especially because at least some of these numbers
dialed are set forth on monthly bills. 65 Therefore, there was no reason
to expect that numbers would not be recorded. 66 Thus, the actions
were not even considered a “search,” and the records were available
without a warrant.67
Kyllo v. United States stands for the proposition that where the
government uses a device not in general public use to explore the
details of a home “unknowable without physical intrusion,” the
surveillance is a “search” and is presumptively “unreasonable” without
a warrant.68 This is pertinent for Naperville Smart Meter Awareness
because it involved a home invasion in the context of advancing
technology. Agents used a thermal-imaging device to scan Kyllo’s
triplex to determine whether the heat emanating from it was consistent
with lamps generally used for indoor marijuana growth. 69 Both the
majority and dissent set forth a proposed standard as to “whether the
technology offers the functional equivalent of actual presence in the
area being searched.”70 However, the majority specifically focused on

62

442 U.S. 735 (1979).
Id.
64 Id. at 741.
65 Id. at 745.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 745–46.
68 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
69 Id. at 27.
70 Id. at 39.
63
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retaining the Fourth Amendment’s original meaning. 71 The Court did
so by holding that the government conducts a “search” when it uses a
device not in general public use to explore details of a home that
would otherwise be unknowable, which is presumptively unreasonable
without a warrant. 72 The dissent notably determined that, because the
infrared camera passively measured heat emitted from a home’s
exterior surfaces, the plaintiff could not have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in that information. 73 This “through-the-wall” theory of
what constitutes a search suggested that anything leaving the home,
like an aroma, would not be a search, nor would it be reasonable for an
individual to expect this fact to remain private. 74 The dissent likewise
expressed concern with the majority’s characterization of whether
something is “in general public use,” a factor that disappears once the
technology breaches the public sphere. 75
In 2012, the Supreme Court held that installation of the global
positioning system (“GPS”) tracking device on the plaintiff’s Jeep
monitoring the vehicle’s movements was a Fourth Amendment
“search.”76 Jones was in possession of his Jeep at all times, and the
agents, although legally authorized to install a tracking device on the
vehicle within ten days of issuance while the vehicle was located in
the District of Columbia, installed the device on the vehicle on the
eleventh day, and in Maryland.77 Justice Alito, concurring, specifically
noted that it was the successful functioning of the GPS device that
constituted a search and not the placement of the GPS device itself.78
It is worth noting that United States v. Jones overturned United States
71

Id. at 40 (stating that the Fourth Amendment “is to be construed in the light
of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted”
(quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925))).
72 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 27.
73 Id. at 41 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
74 Id. at 43–44.
75 Id. at 47.
76 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
77 Id. at 402–03.
78 Id. at 420–21 (Alito, J., concurring).
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v. Garcia.79 In Garcia, the Seventh Circuit held that, where police
attached a GPS tracking device to a suspect’s car, doing so was not a
search, nor was it a seizure of the car.80 The Seventh Circuit held that
it was not a seizure because the device did not affect the car’s driving
qualities, draw energy from the car, or otherwise “seize” anything
from the car.81 The Seventh Circuit also held that the GPS placement
was not a search because the GPS was merely a substitute for a public
activity: following a car on a public street. 82 However, the Jones Court
found that the car was an “effect” within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, and the warrantless GPS placement on the Jeep was a
physical intrusion that violated the Fourth Amendment. 83
In its most recent interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, 84 the
Court analyzed two overlapping lines of cases; those that implicate a
person’s expectation of privacy in: (1) physical location;85 and (2)
information voluntarily turned over to third parties. 86 In Carpenter v.
United States, wireless carriers produced cell-site location information
(“CSLI”), providing the government with 12,898 location points that
catalogued Carpenter’s movements over 127 days. 87 The government
obtained this information via court orders pursuant to the Stored
Communications Act after setting forth “specific and articulable facts
showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe” that the records
sought “are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal
79

474 F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 996–97.
81 Id. at 996.
82 Id. at 997.
83 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 414 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring).
84 See generally Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, (2018).
85 See generally Jones, 565 U.S. at 400.
86 See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (finding there is no
expectation of privacy in financial records held by a bank); Smith v. Maryland, 442
U.S. 735 (1979) (finding there is no expectation of privacy in the records of dialed
telephone numbers conveyed to a telephone company).
87 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2209.
80
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investigation.”88 The government used the information to produce
maps placing Carpenter’s phone near four of the charged robbery
locations.89 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the
district court, holding that Carpenter lacked a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the information given to the FBI because he had
voluntarily shared that information with his cell phone provider, a
third party.90
The Carpenter Court likened the CSLI data to GPS data, like that
at issue in Jones, because in both instances, it is “detailed,
encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled.” 91 However, the Carpenter
Court found that the CSLI data was of greater concern than the GPS
data because CSLI data involves “the individual continuously
reveal[ing] his location to his wireless carrier.” 92A defendant traveling
over public streets may “voluntarily convey[] to anyone who wanted
to look the fact that he was traveling over particular roads in a
particular direction.”93 In United States v. Knotts, the government used
a beeper merely to assist in tracking a vehicle that was also being
followed via air search. 94 However, Knotts was in contrast to
Carpenter because the CSLI data collected was the only means used to
track Carpenter.95 The movements in Knotts were on public roads, and
the beeper was placed to assist law enforcement in tracking the
movements, and on a short-term basis.96 Carpenter “is not about
‘using a phone’ or a person’s movement at a particular time,” but is
“about a detailed chronicle of a person’s physical presence compiled

88

Id. at 2212.
Id. at 2212–13.
90 Id. at 2213.
91 Id. at 2216.
92 Id.
93 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983).
94 Id.
95 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212–13.
96 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284–85.
89
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every day.”97 Thus, the privacy concerns at issue in Carpenter are
greater than those in Smith or Miller.98
The Court took greater concern with the proposition that CSLI is
“shared” with the wireless carrier within the meaning of the third-party
doctrine.99 Specifically, the Court found that CSLI is not shared like
typical information because cell phones and their services are “such a
pervasive and insistent part of daily life” that carrying one is
“indispensable to participation in modern society.” 100 There is no
“affirmative act” a user takes to share information with a cellular
provider; powering up means that sharing is constant and the phone
will automatically generate CSLI based on calls, texts, e-mails, and
other data connections. 101 Thus, a person’s “options” are to (1)
disconnect a phone from the network, or (2) to “unvoluntarily” leave a
trail of location data. 102 For these reasons, and what can only be
considered as Carpenter’s “unvoluntarily” shared data trail, the Court
declined to extend the third-party doctrine principles behind Smith and
Miller to Carpenter.103
It is important to note that Carpenter is a narrow decision. 104
Smith and Miller remain good law, and the Carpenter decision is not
intended to “call into question conventional surveillance techniques
and tools, such as surveillance cameras.” 105 Moreover, because CSLI
is “an entirely different species of business record” because it
“implicates basic Fourth Amendment concerns about arbitrary
government power much more directly than corporate tax or payroll
ledgers,” a warrant theoretically would have been required to obtain

97

Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.
Id.
99 Id.
100 Id. (quoting Riley v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014)).
101 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id.
98
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the CSLI in this matter. 106 The Court set forth that “[i]f the third-party
doctrine does not apply to the ‘modern-day equivalents of an
individual’s own “papers” or “effects,”’ then the clear implication is
that the documents should receive full Fourth Amendment
protection.107 Notably, there are case-specific exceptions to the
warrantless search of an individual’s CSLI, such as when there is a
need to pursue a fleeing suspect. 108 Summarily, the Court declined to
grant the state unrestricted access to CSLI due to its revealing “depth,
breadth, and comprehensive reach, and the inescapable and automatic
nature of its collection.”109 The third-party doctrine has no bearing on
whether the records in Naperville Smart Meter Awareness deserved
Fourth Amendment protection because there is no third party.
From the Katz decision in 1967 to the Carpenter decision in 2018,
two, vital Fourth Amendment frameworks of analysis hold true. The
first is that location is relevant to the extent that there was a trespass.
In Smith, the Court considered placement of the pen register tap to rule
out trespass, specifically considering whether the citizen’s “‘property’
was invaded or [whether] police intruded into a ‘constitutionally
protected area.’”110 The Smith Court then clarified the distinction
between the property-based Fourth Amendment right and a privacybased right, distinguishing that the issue is whether the government
infringed “a legitimate expectation of privacy.” 111 The court aptly
referred to this as the Katz analysis, and rightfully so: it was the first of
a long line of cases that would further distinguish property- and
privacy-based Fourth Amendment rights. 112 The second framework is
that the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.113 The Katz
Court did not consider it dispositive where a phone conversation
106

Id. at 2222.
Id.
108 Id. at 2223.
109 Id.
110 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979).
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
107
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occurred; it only mattered that the conversation occurred and that it
was recorded.114 That was because “[w]hat a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject
of Fourth Amendment protection.” 115 Again, this rendered location
irrelevant for a privacy-based interest because a person may
knowingly expose something to the public in his home – an area
explicitly protected by the Fourth Amendment – meaning that
anything knowingly revealed could not reasonably be expected to
remain private.
II. NAPERVILLE SMART METER AWARENESS
In Naperville Smart Meter Awareness, the Seventh Circuit
determined whether the City of Naperville’s data collection from the
electric public utility – which collected data in fifteen-minute intervals
– was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and Article I, § 6 of the Illinois Constitution. 116 The City
of Naperville, without the consent of its citizens, installed digital
“smart meters” to replace traditional, analog meters on all residences
to upgrade its power grid. 117 Smart meters show the amount of
electricity being used and when it is used. 118 This can reveal
information about what is happening inside the home, including
energy-consumption patterns. 119 With this information, and the
growing catalogue of appliance load signatures, researchers can
predict which appliances are present in a home and when they are
114

Id. (deeming it unimportant that the conversation at issue occurred in a
“public” area (the telephone booth) and that it is irrelevant, for Fourth Amendment
purposes, as to where certain activities took place).
115 Katz, 389 U.S. at 347.
116 Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. City of Naperville, 900 F.3d 521,
524–25 (7th Cir. 2018).
117 Id. at 524.
118 Id.
119 Id. (citing Rashed Mohassel et al., A Survey on Advanced Metering
Infrastructure, 63 INT’L J. ELECTRICAL POWER & ENERGY SYS. 473, 478 (2014)).
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used.120 The accuracy and nature of predictions depend on how often
data is collected, as well as the sophistication of the technology used
to analyze this data. 121 Data from the meters is stored for up to three
years.122
Naperville Smart Meter Awareness is a citizens’ group that
brought suit over concern that the meters revealed intimate details of
citizens within their homes, such as when they are home, sleeping and
eating routines, and what is kept and used in the home and when. 123
The Seventh Circuit held that the data collected was a search even
though it was necessary to draw inferences from the data to determine
any personal information about what was actually occurring in a
home.124 The Seventh Circuit likened the search to that in Kyllo, where
officials drew inferences from the home’s thermal energy to conclude
that special lamps that grow marijuana were being used.125 However,
the Seventh Circuit noted that the smart meter issue is more invasive
than rudimentary thermal images, supporting its finding that collection
of the data was a search. 126
Although the Seventh Circuit found, without hesitation, that the
smart meter data collection was a search, it deemed this search
reasonable.127 The court partly based its’ opinion on the City of
Naperville’s amended “Smart Grid Customer Bill of Rights,” which
specifies that without a warrant or court order, the public utility may
not provide customer information to third parties.128 The third-party
doctrine establishes that individuals have reduced expectations of
120

Naperville Smart Meter Awareness, 900 F.3d at 524 (citing A. Prudenzi, A
Neuron Nets Based Procedure for Identifying Domestic Appliances Pattern-of-Use
from Energy Recordings at Meter Panel, 2 IEEE POWER ENGINEERING SOC’Y
WINTER MEETING 941 (2002)).
121 Naperville Smart Meter Awareness, 900 F.3d at 524.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 526–27.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 527.
127 Id. at 527–29.
128 Id. at 528.
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privacy “in information knowingly shared with another.” 129 The City
of Naperville argued that by entering into a “voluntary” relationship to
purchase electricity from the city, citizens sacrificed any expectation
of privacy in smart meter data.130 The Seventh Circuit was not
persuaded by this argument, and found that because the City of
Naperville provides electricity through its public utility, there was no
third party involved.131
Because energy usage itself is not a crime, the court deemed the
privacy interests in question in Naperville Smart Meter Awareness to
be more insignificant than they are in cases where regulatory law
violations are criminally enforced.132 The court found that the
government’s interest in the data collection was substantial, where
“the modernization of the electrical grid is a priority for both
Naperville . . . and the federal government,” as it allows “utilities to
restore service more quickly,” “offer[s] time-based pricing” by
reducing strain on the grid, and reduces the utilities’ labor costs.133
Notably, the Seventh Circuit included a cautionary note
immediately preceding its conclusion. The court advised that its
holding was dependent on the particular circumstances of the case
before it, stating that its conclusion might change “[w]ere a city to
collect the data at shorter intervals” or “if the data was more easily
accessible to law enforcement or other city officials outside the
utility.”134 Thus, while there was no doubt that this information was a
search, the “government interests in the program, and the diminished
privacy interests at stake” rendered the search wholly reasonable
without a warrant. 135
129

Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2210 (2018).
Naperville Smart Meter Awareness, 900 F.3d at 527.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 528 (finding that the warrantless search of private property is
“unreasonable” and that the resident had a right to deny warrantless entry by the
inspector (discussing Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967))).
133 Naperville Smart Meter Awareness, 900 F.3d at 528–29.
134 Id. at 29.
135 Id.
130
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III. SEVENTH CIRCUIT COMPLICATIONS
During oral argument in Carpenter, Nathan Freed Wessler (“Mr.
Wessler”) of the American Civil Liberties Union noted the lower
courts’ struggle to apply Miller and Smith to sensitive, digital age
records.136 Specifically, Mr. Wessler noted that the five courts of
appeals are “virtually begging [the Supreme] Court to provide
guidance for how to protect these sensitive, digital records that the
Court simply could not have imagined four decades ago. 137 Mr.
Wessler continued, proposing that certain types of information, “like
heart rate data from a smart watch, or fertility tracking data from a
smartphone app, information about the interior of a home, for
example, from a smart thermostat that knows when the homeowner is
at home and perhaps what room they’re in,” could be categorized into
records that either are or are not protected. 138 Thus, Mr. Wessler
proposed that it is consistent with the role of the lower courts to take
an interpretative principle from the Supreme Court and apply it over
time.139
The Seventh Circuit’s landmark decision in Naperville Smart
Meter Awareness is precedential in the Seventh Circuit, and other
circuits have yet to decide similar issues. After all, in 2016 alone,
electric utilities in the United States had about 70.8 million advanced
(smart) meter installations, about 88 percent of which were residential
consumer installations. 140 Experts predict smart meter installation
across the United States will reach 90 million by 2020.141 Thus,
136

Transcript of Oral Argument at 33–34, Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.
Ct. 2206 (2018) (No. 16-402).
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., Frequently Asked Questions, EIA.GOV (Oct. 26,
2018), https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=108&t=3.
141 ADAM COOPER, THE EDISON FOUND.: INST. FOR ELEC. INNOVATION,
ELECTRIC COMPANY SMART METER DEPLOYMENTS: FOUNDATION FOR A SMART
GRID (Dec. 2017),
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precedent established before more widespread smart meter
dissemination will be of great importance in coming years. This is
especially true where law enforcement will presumably turn to this
technology for investigative purposes, most likely when it is in
“general public use.”142 The Seventh Circuit’s decision, specifically in
the government interest balancing analysis, is dangerous, if not
detrimental, to this vital precedent. The Seventh Circuit’s reasoning
plainly ignores constitutional commands to apply strict scrutiny where
a fundamental right is concerned, too. This arbitrary analysis, coupled
with the potential, virtually unlimited uses for smart meter data in law
enforcement, highlights the dangers lurking in the Seventh Circuit’s
Naperville Smart Meter Awareness decision.
A. Precedential History
“The Fourth Amendment's protection of the home has never been
tied to measurement of the quality or quantity of information
obtained.”143 By way of example, the Supreme Court has held that the
physical invasion of the home, “by even a fraction of an inch,” is too
much.144 All details are intimate details in a home, “because the entire
area is kept safe from prying government eyes.” 145 Thus, any details of
the home are intimate details, regardless of where or the degree to
which they are detected. 146 As was set forth in greater detail above,
Fourth Amendment protections do not apply where intimate details are
readily observable to the public. For example, when a person travels
http://www.edisonfoundation.net/iei/publications/Documents/IEI_Smart%20Meter%
20Report%202017_FINAL.pdf.
142 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
143 Id. at 37.
144 Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961).
145 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37.
146
See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 735 (1984) (finding that a
“search” began when Karo brought the can of ether into his home as it was
“concealed from view”); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987) (finding a search
where the officers searched for the serial number on stereo equipment in “plain
view” in the alleged suspect’s home).
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on a public road, and those movements are available without any
technology or surveillance, there is no reasonable expectation of
privacy in those movements. 147 If a person knowingly exposes
something in the home to the public, even though the Fourth
Amendment explicitly protects the home, there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy in those items or effects, either. 148
It is dangerous to propose any bright line, categorical rule of what
constitutes an “unreasonable” search based on discrete categories of
information. After all, the Court has historically, and repeatedly, held
that a search is a search when it reveals any details within the home. 149
This is even more precarious when one considers the rapidly
advancing nature of technology. Even at a foundational level, there is
no necessary connection between what is “intimate” and “the
sophistication of surveillance equipment.” 150 On point with Naperville
Smart Meter Awareness is the Supreme Court’s prior finding that it is
insignificant – in terms of the intimacy of information – whether
technology reveals “what hour each night the lady of the house takes
her daily sauna and bath” or “nothing more intimate than the fact that
someone left a closet light on.” 151 Undoubtedly, courts will differ in
what they subjectively find to be “intimate.”152 Therefore, so will
those courts’ findings as to what is considered the reasonable subject
of a search, which may or may not be permissible without a warrant.
Such subjectivity is dangerous, especially when new technology
reveals increasingly precise data beyond a mere light being left on. 153
Mr. Wessler’s suggestion that certain data – especially
information from a smart thermostat – can be placed in a discrete
147

United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (“A person traveling in
an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in
his movements from one place to another.”).
148 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
149 See supra notes 68-75.
150 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 38.
151 Id. at 38–39.
152 Id. at 38.
153 Id.
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category is shortsighted.154 Information from a thermostat is
information from within a home that would not otherwise be known to
anyone outside of the home without a search. Naperville Smart Meter
Awareness raises analogous issues. Smart meters can record data in a
range of intervals, but those in the City of Naperville record
information every fifteen minutes.155 The information can reveal not
only what is left on in a home, such as a closet light, but may also
uncover other details within a home that would otherwise remain
anonymous.156 To qualify the City of Naperville’s residents’ Fourth
Amendment rights with a “government interest analysis” in light of the
“particular circumstances of this case” contradicts precedent, violates
mandated constitutional standards of review (strict scrutiny), and
establishes dangerous precedent for the judiciary moving forward. 157
B. Policy Implications
The Carpenter Court grappled with a person’s expectation of
privacy in today’s digital age. 158 Ultimately, the Carpenter Court
declined to extend Smith and Miller to cell site location data. 159 It did
so because of the “unique nature of cell phone location records,”
finding Smith and Miller inapplicable regardless of “[w]hether the
Government employs its own surveillance technology, as in Jones, or
leverages the technology of a wireless carrier.” 160 Cell phone records
contain the “privacies of life,”161 and tracking is “remarkably easy,

154

See supra note 138.
Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. City of Naperville, 900 F.3d 521, 524
(7th Cir. 2018).
156 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
157 See generally Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
158 Id.
159 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217.
160 Id.
161 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014) (quoting Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
155
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cheap, and efficient compared to traditional investigative tools.” 162
Further, and analogous to GPS information, “the time-stamped data
provides an intimate window into a person’s life, revealing not only
his particular movements, but through them his ‘familial, political,
professional, religious, and sexual associations.’” 163
Carpenter specifically implicated the third-party doctrine first set
forth in Smith and Miller.164 Smith and Miller held that individuals
lack “any protected Fourth Amendment interests in records that are
possessed, owned, and controlled by a third party.” 165 The Carpenter
Court declined to extend the third-party doctrine to the CSLI records,
finding that, in the “rare case where the suspect has a legitimate
privacy interest in records held by a third party,” a warrant is required
for a “reasonable” search. 166 The Carpenter Court furthered this in
stating that “[i]f the third-party doctrine does not apply to the
‘modern-day equivalents of an individual’s own “papers” or
“effects,”’ then the clear implication is that the documents should
receive full Fourth Amendment protection.”167 Indeed, the Jones
Court, just years ago in 2012, reconsidered the premise that an
individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in voluntarily
disclosed information.168 The Court found this approach ill-suited to
the digital age, “in which people reveal a great deal of information
about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out
mundane tasks.”169 This includes disclosure to online retailers of
something as simple as the “books, groceries, and medications” that
162.

Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218.
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring).
164 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219.
165 Id. at 2260 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
166 Id. at 2211 (majority opinion).
167 Id.
168 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417–18 (2012) (citing Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443
(1976)).
169 Jones, 565 U.S. at 417.
163
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individuals purchase.170 Notably, the court addresses Justice Alito’s
point regarding how some may find the “tradeoff” of privacy for
convenience “worthwhile” or that the decrease in privacy is simply
“inevitable.”171 Yet, the Court found that sharing information, no
matter how mundane, simply by using a phone or the Internet, does
not render a search of that information reasonable.172 Thus, much of
the debate regarding modern applications of third-party doctrine,
though not directly at issue in Carpenter, is policy-focused on what
level of privacy is expected in today’s society.
To that end, the Jones Court specifically suggested that if change
is warranted, it should come from the judicial branch.173 Technology
changes dramatically over time. Because of this, the Court found that
“[a] legislative body is well situated to gauge changing public
attitudes, to draw detailed lines, and to balance privacy and public
safety in a comprehensive way.” 174 The same can be said about smart
meter technology. The smart meter movement is rapidly growing.175
As more Americans are affected by the technology, and the
technology becomes increasingly sophisticated and intrusive, attitudes
as to what is actually “disclosed” through use of electric utilities are
likely to change.
This is illustrative of the primary issue in Naperville Smart Meter
Awareness: smart meters are the next major iteration of intrusive home
technology, and public opinion is likely to change as the technology
grows more sophisticated. Further, smart meters are not limited to
electric utilities; gas companies have also begun implementing use of
the technology. Thus, it is unsound for the judiciary to set precedent in
an area that is volatile and subject to change. Moreover, the Seventh
Circuit’s treatment of the “reasonable” issue – revolving around

170

Id.
Id. at 418.
172 Id.
173 Id. at 429–30.
174 Id.
175 See supra notes 140-141.
171
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infrastructural priorities and costs – should not undermine what
constitutes a “reasonable” search.
This calls into question how Fourth Amendment privacies can be
reconciled with municipal needs. The City of Naperville’s citizens
were given no voice in the smart meter upgrade, nor could they take
their electrical needs to another company because the municipality is
the sole electric provider. Thus, there are competing interests between
citizen privacy and government interests. There are two plausible ways
to reconcile the two with the Fourth Amendment: (1) citizens would
presumably need to voluntarily consent to smart meter installation
(and therefore freely share their usage data); or (2) a court would have
to find that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in the data.
Yet, it would be almost impossible for a court to fulfill that second
task, provided that the data would not exist but for the technology
itself. Moreover, the data reveals intimate details within a home that,
absent the smart meters, would not be available to utility providers or,
potentially, local law enforcement. The smart meter data reveals
“intimate details of the home” within the meaning of Fourth
Amendment precedent, and without voluntary consent, it is difficult to
see how citizens would not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
those intimate details.176
A bright line rule of what is “reasonable,” or any attempts at a
sliding scale approach that weighs parties’ interests against one
another, are ill-conceived, impractical, and lack a foundation in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. In his Carpenter dissent, Justice Kennedy
noted that the Court found that officials crossed “a constitutional line”
by obtaining more than six days of cell-site records.177 He
characterized this finding as “illogical” and something that will
“frustrate principled application of the Fourth Amendment” in “vital
law enforcement operations.”178 While Justice Kennedy’s concerns
may not yet be true of smart meter data, court application of the Fourth
176

Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001).
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2234 (2018) (Kennedy, J,
dissenting).
178 Id.
177
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Amendment is intended to anticipate major technological change. 179
As such, setting untenable precedent now regarding how and when a
Fourth Amendment search is reasonable, and the factors applicable to
the same, is ill advised. The Seventh Circuit’s holding generally
permits utility providers, including the City of Naperville, to amass
intimate details regarding its customers’ homes and to store the data
for up to three years without customer consent.180 Courts almost
universally consider the “slippery slope” argument, refusing to set
precedent where it could harm future plaintiffs through generalizations
and expansions of precedential principles. The Seventh Circuit’s
analysis and holding in Naperville Smart Meter Awareness is
threatening for this reason.
Even more troubling is what the Seventh Circuit does not discuss:
the implications for permitting this amassing of data. Though there are
no criminal charges at issue in Naperville Smart Meter Awareness,
like those in Carpenter, the implications for the use of this data in a
criminal investigation remain operative. After all, what is to stop law
enforcement from, after years of data collection, accessing this data as
part of an ongoing investigation? Without the smart meter data, there
would be no data detailing intimate usage patterns within a home.
And, because the data can hypothetically be stored for years, the
precedent here will intrusively alter law enforcement’s access to
information that may lead to convictions whereas before, that
information did not exist. The City of Naperville’s citizens were not
given a choice in whether they had a smart meter installed. As such,
the forced installation of the smart meters, which store information
that could, at an undeterminable future date, be used as part of an
investigation is the real question the court should consider in
Naperville Smart Meter Awareness. The Seventh Circuit even
cautioned that the holding could be different depending on the
accessibility of the data at issue to law enforcement. 181 Without a
179

Id. (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 473–74 (1928)).
Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. City of Naperville, 900 F.3d 521, 524
(7th Cir. 2018).
181 Id. at 529.
180
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crystal ball, there is no way of knowing how the information may be
used at a future date. However, it is clear that today, the Seventh
Circuit’s holding plainly violates Fourth Amendment rights and uses a
factor-based interest analysis to hold that government interests
outweigh fundamental liberties granted in the Bill of Rights.
C. Proposed Change/Analysis
Fourth Amendment rights weigh in favor of the citizens and
shield them from law enforcement and other parties with “arbitrary
power” that might wrongfully obtain access to certain records. 182 The
Seventh Circuit justified the City of Naperville’s collection of electric
usage in fifteen-minute intervals because smart meters provide for
more efficient power restoration, reduce strain on the power grid, and
reduce labor costs. 183 Weighing these interests against one another,
and qualifying the holding with notes as to how minor differences in
fact – such as the interval of data collection – may affect the holding is
akin to the distinction Justice Kennedy set forth in Carpenter.184 After
all, smart meter technology is still in its early stages. 185 Thus, like the
thermal imaging technology at issue in Kyllo, which, though
rudimentary at the time, still constituted an unreasonable search, the
more advanced data available via smart meters should follow the same
logic.186 After all, the underlying Act – the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009 (“Recovery Act”) – is not yet a decade old.
Thus, the Seventh Circuit is setting precedent in an area where the
technology is arguably not yet in “general public use.”187

182

Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
Naperville Smart Meter Awareness, 900 F.3d at 528–29.
184 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2234 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
185 U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, Recovery Act Smart Grid Programs,
SMARTGRID.GOV, https://www.smartgrid.gov/recovery_act/index.html (last visited
Oct. 18, 2018).
186 See generally Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
187 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 27.
183
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The primary issue with the Seventh Circuit’s holding in
Naperville Smart Meter Awareness is the court’s attempt to draw the
same, fine line of what is “reasonable,” as the Carpenter Court did. By
way of example, the Seventh Circuit held, based off of subjective
factors, that fifteen-minute interval utility data collection was
reasonable when weighed against substantial government interests. 188
The court focused on the City of Naperville’s interests, along with the
Federal Government’s interests, in updating the power grid based on
the 2009 Recovery Act. 189 Yet, the court provided other justifications
for its holding relating to consumers, who were given no legitimate
choice whether their traditional meters were upgraded.190 For example,
the court emphasized that smart meters allow quicker utility
restoration after an outage and time-based pricing.191 The court further
provided that the City of Naperville could have avoided the
controversy altogether “by giving its residents genuine opportunity to
consent to the installation of smart meters, as many other utilities
have.”192
This analysis, coupled the phrasing of the Naperville Smart Meter
Awareness test, is a weaker version of the strict scrutiny standard that
must be used when a fundamental right is at issue.193 The Fourth
Amendment, as part of the Bill of Rights, confers fundamental rights
to citizens of the many states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 194
Thus, strict scrutiny should be applied. 195 This means that there must
be a compelling state interest, the legal provision must be narrowly
tailored to accomplish that interest, and the legal provision must

188

Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. City of Naperville, 900 F.3d 521,
528–29 (7th Cir. 2018).
189 Id. at 524.
190 Id.
191 Id. at 528.
192 Id. at 529.
193 In re R.C., 195 Ill. 2d 291, 303 (Ill. 2001).
194 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
195 In re R.C., 195 Ill. 2d at 303.
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accomplish that interest by the least restrictive means available. 196 The
Seventh Circuit reasoned along different parameters, finding that the
“search,” here the collection of smart meter data, must be
“reasonable.”197 Yet, nowhere in the opinion does the Seventh Circuit
mention that the City of Naperville and Federal Government had a
“compelling” interest in installation of the meters. Instead, the Seventh
Circuit weighed citizen privacy interests with the government’s
interest in data collection, 198 holding that the benefits stack in the favor
of the government’s interest and, that because “the search is unrelated
to law enforcement, is minimally invasive, and presents little risk of
corollary criminal consequences,” it was reasonable. 199 This less
rigorous standard supports the Seventh Circuit’s holding while
obliterating fundamental rights. An interest analysis in any Fourth
Amendment context does not appreciate the scope and importance of
what is at stake, something markedly absent from the Seventh
Circuit’s opinion and consideration of this matter.
Thus, the crux of the court’s holding is based on consumerfocused factors, all while Naperville Smart Meter Awareness’ primary
complaint is that there cannot be a voluntary disclosure of this
information to the utility provider because citizens were given no
meaningful choice in the installation of the smart meters.200 It is
counterintuitive for a court to model a holding on consumer-focused
interests when consumers are the individuals objecting to this data
collection. This undermines Fourth Amendment protections and
precariously overlooks what will become increasingly sensitive data as
smart meter technology advances, shorter intervals are recorded, or the
data is used by law enforcement with increasing regularity. Because
Naperville Smart Meter Awareness focused solely on the collection of
this data in the ordinary course of business, any criminal implications
196

In re D.W., 214 Ill. 2d 289 (2005); Schultz v. Lakewood Elec. Corp., 362
Ill. App. 3d 716 (1st Dist. 2005), appeal denied, 218 Ill. 2d 557 (Mar. 29, 2006).
197 Naperville Smart Meter, 900 F.3d at 527–29.
198 Id.
199 Id. at 529.
200 Id. at 527.
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likely to arise in these other situations are not yet at issue. However,
inaction unless and until a case arises where smart meter data is used
in a criminal matter is nonsensical. Constitutional rights were violated,
and these rights should be addressed before smart meters proliferate
and utility companies begin amassing this data. This further
emphasizes the dangers of the Seventh Circuit opinion, as the court
was not overly protective of intimate details – data from within the
home and not readily available without smart meter technology. 201
Mr. Wessler’s suggestion that certain types of searches are
“reasonable” or “unreasonable” without a warrant is similarly
tenuous.202 In fact, his suggestion that thermostat data is inclusive of
what can be properly categorized 203 as either reasonable or
unreasonable stands in contradiction to longstanding case law. 204 Any
data pertaining to the interior of a home that would be unavailable
without the use of some technology to collect said data constitutes a
search.205 To find that any category of data is reasonable without a
warrant ignores the particular facts and circumstances of any case that
comes before the court. This is something the Seventh Circuit
emphasized as critical in its Naperville Smart Meter Awareness
analysis.206 For example, had the intervals been shorter, the Seventh
Circuit’s holding in Naperville Smart Meter Awareness might have
been different.207 Enacting specific categories is problematic for these

201

See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 735 (1984) (finding that a
“search” began when Karo brought the can of ether into his home as it was
“concealed from view”); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987) (finding a search
where the officers searched for the serial number on stereo equipment in “plain
view” in the alleged suspect’s home).
202 Transcript of Oral Argument at 33–34, Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.
Ct. 2206 (2018) (No. 16-402).
203 Id.
204 See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
205 Id.
206 Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. City of Naperville, 900 F.3d 521, 529
(7th Cir. 2018).
207 Id.
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reasons, and courts should exercise extreme caution when considering
similar issues on a case-by-case basis.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Seventh Circuit is the first federal court to render a decision
regarding smart meter data in the context of the Fourth Amendment.
As this technology continues to proliferate and improve in accordance
with the Recovery Act, more courts will likely rule on the same issue.
Naperville Smart Meter Awareness presented a contentious question to
the Seventh Circuit because citizens lacked any meaningful choice of
whether intimate details within the home were disclosed to the City of
Naperville as the sole electric utility provider. Generally speaking, the
precarious weighing of various subjective factors and interests was,
and will continue to be, unconstitutionally under-protective and
problematic, as would be the enumeration of discrete categories of
data that should or should not be protected.
The Fourth Amendment’s language does not change in the same
manner that technology does, but a court’s interpretation of its basic
protections, as applied to that technology, must. It is important that
Fourth Amendment rights are granted the same protection in all
contexts as technology proliferates, advances, and grows more
intrusive in the home. All courts should proceed on a case-by-case
basis in weighing smart meter data and whether a search of that data is
reasonable. Where there are violations of the fundamental rights
safeguarded by the Fourth Amendment, it is essential that courts use a
strict scrutiny standard before eliminating those rights.
There will never be neat categories of technology that should or
should not constitute a “reasonable search.” Whether a search is
reasonable will be context-specific and depend on several factors, such
as the length of the data collection or whether an individual knowingly
revealed the data to a third party or otherwise. However, it should
never be dependent on what it reveals, as a search of the home is a
search of the home regardless of what data that search produces. Any
lingering uncertainties must be addressed under strict scrutiny
128
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analysis, which will almost certainly occur in the near future as smart
meters continue to spread across the United States.
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